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Abstract: The grue paradox, also called the new riddle of induction, posed a great 
challenge to the common understanding about induction. This paper shows that there 
is a close relation between the grue paradox and the problem of conditionals. This 
paper presents a general form of the grue predicate. Based on the general form, this 
paper argues that this kind of predicates can not be used for induction and prediction. 
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1. The grue paradox 
The grue paradox was originally conceived by Nelson Goodman in his book “Fact, 
Fiction, and Forecast” [1].  
Consider a hypothesis: “All emeralds are green.” Clearly this hypothesis is confirmed 
by observations of green emeralds. Because all emeralds examined thus far are green. 
This leads us to conclude that also in the future emeralds will be green. 
Now consider a new hypothesis: “All emeralds are grue.” Relative to a fix time t in 
the future, the predicate grue is defined as follows: An object X satisfies the 
proposition "X is grue" if X is green and was examined before time t, or blue and was 
not examined before t.  
All the evidences, which confirm the green hypothesis, also confirm the grue 
hypothesis. But the grue hypothesis forecast that the emeralds examined after time t 
will be blue. This is counter-intuitive.  
About the grue paradox, Putnam said: “The central difficulty, which Goodman was 
the first highlight, is the projection problem: what distinguishes the properties one can 
inductively project from a sample to a population from the properties that are more or 
less resistant to such projection?”[2] 
Goodman argued that the green hypothesis is more entrenched than the grue 
hypothesis. But what is the meaning of entrenchment, it remains unclear. Many other 
scholars attempted to solve this problem, but their methods are unsatisfactory. This 
paper will present a new method. 
 
2. The conditional problems 
There is a close relation between the grue paradox and the problem of conditionals. 
Also in the "Fact, Fiction and Forecast", we can find examples of the problem of 
conditionals.[3] 
Consider a hypothesis: “All marbles in the bag are red.” Suppose that we know that 
all marbles except d are red. By the usual kind of confirmation theory this gives 
strong confirmation for the red hypothesis.  
Consider a new hypothesis: “All marbles are P.” P means that “in the bag and either is 
not d and is red, or is d and is not red.” The known facts also give confirmation for 
this hypothesis. But this hypothesis will forecast that d is not red. 
 
3. The general form of the grue paradox 
Combined with the grue paradox and the problem of conditionals, we can get a 
general form of the grue paradox. Given a predicate G(x), P(x) means: "G(x) if x has 
been observed and ~G(x) if x has not been observed."  
In more general form, P(x) means: "G(x) if x has been observed and S(x) if x has not 
been observed." S(x) is an arbitrary predicate. In formal form, it is: “(O(x)→G(x)) 
and (~O(x) →S(x)))”. O(x) means that x has been observed.  
From the general form of the grue predicate, we can get lots of similar predicates. For 
example, Green_Square(x) mean : "Green(x) if x has been observed and Square(x) if 
x has not been observed." Green_NotBlue(x) mean : "Green(x) if x has been observed 
and ~Blue(x) if x has not been observed." These predicates are intuitively 
meaningless.  
 
4. The more general form of the grue paradox 
Considering the antecedents and consequents of predicates, a more general form of 
the grue paradox is: “(O(x) →( P(x) →G(x))) and (~O(x) →(Q(x)→S(x)))”. 
Only Under the premises “Q(x) →P(x)” and “G(x) →S(x)”, can the predicate (O(x) 
and P(x) →G(x) ) and (~O(x) and Q(x) →S(x) ) be meaningful. 
We could not use this kind of predicate for forecast, because it is meaningless. A 
question is whether some meaningful conclusions also have been ruled out? The 
answer is not, because we can also get these conclusions from right arguments. 
The inductive method is a process of using observations to develop general principles 
about the known subjects, and make prediction about the unknown subjects.  
The general form of the grue predicates has two features. On the one hand, they 
confine the projections of known subject to past experience. On the other hand, they 
make arbitrary predictions about the unknown subjects. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper presents a general form of the grue paradox. Based on the general form, 
this paper argues that this kind of predicates can not be used for induction and 
predication. By solving the grue paradox, this paper makes a contribution to what is 
not induction. 
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